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SUMMARY 
Each year there are on average 40 landing overruns with commercial and 
executive aircraft worldwide. Analysis of the causes has shown that landing long 
on the runway was a causal factor in 40% of all landing overruns. Further analysis 
also showed that the risk of overrunning the runway increases by a factor in the 
order of 55 when the landing is long. 
 
A long landing is clearly unwanted as it increases the required landing distance. 
As a consequence the available margin in landing distance reduces, increasing 
the risk of a landing overrun. The airborne distance (from threshold to 
touchdown) is affected by a number of factors. This paper discusses the most 
important factors that are related to the airborne distance and their relation to 
long landings. For this purpose an analysis is conducted of both landing 
overruns in which long landings were a causal factor as well as flight data of 
day-to-day landings obtained from a number of (mainly) European operators. 
 
It became clear from the study that that are several factors that can be a reason 
for the aircraft to land long. The most dominate factors are flying too high and 
too fast during the airborne manoeuvre, significant tailwind, early flares, floating 
of the aircraft, and use of runway exits far down on a relatively long runway (it 
appears that long landings are not strongly correlated to the actual runway 
length: they occur as frequently on relatively short runways as on long runways 
with ample landing distance available. The runway exit position has a much 
stronger influence on the probability of long landings). Some of these factors 
could occur simultaneously increasing the possibility of a long landing even 
further. A large number of the factors that contributed to long landings can be 
traced back to an unstabilised approach. 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2011-120 
March 2011   5 
 
CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 6 
1.1 Background 6 
1.2 Objectives 7 
2 CERTIFICATION, AIRCRAFT OPERATING MANUALS AND THE AIRBORNE 
DISTANCE 8 
3 FACTORS INFLUENCING AIRBORNE DISTANCE AND LONG LANDINGS 9 
3.1 Approach speed 9 
3.2 Height over threshold 9 
3.3 Flare height and floating 11 
3.4 Tailwind and wind shear 12 
3.5 Touchdown zone markers 13 
3.6 Runway length and runway exits 14 
3.7 Miscellaneous factors 15 
4 FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS 17 
5 REFERENCES 18 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 18 
 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2011-120 
March 2011   6 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
On May 28, 2005 a Citation V landed at Leeds Bradford Airport. The aircraft was 
not stopped on the runway and overran the end of the runway by a distance of 
approximately 160 metres. The approach was unstable however no go-around 
was initiated by the crew. The aircraft began the landing flare in the region of the 
touchdown zone at a speed of 155 kt, floated for a considerable distance along 
the runway and then touched down beyond the runway mid-point at a speed of 
121 kt. The commander had in mind that the runway was long (for this aircraft) 
and so he was very confident that he had plenty of runway available. It was only 
as he crested the rise of the runway and the far end became visible that he 
realised he had overestimated the runway remaining. He did not consider that 
the accident was necessarily as a direct result of the long landing but more the 
result of his lack of perception of the remaining runway length available. He 
considered that had he braked immediately upon landing, the aircraft would have 
had sufficient runway to stop. However the investigation showed that even if he 
had applied full brake pressure immediately on touchdown, the aircraft would 
not have stopped on the runway. The long landing the aircraft made, reduced the 
remaining distance too much to stop the aircraft on the runway. In most cases 
once the touchdown zone of a runway is behind an aircraft there is normally no 
direct indication to the pilots what remaining length is available other than what 
he can see ahead. For this reason, even when there may be excess landing 
distance available, a landing at the touchdown zone is desirable. 
 
Each year there are on average 40 landing overruns with commercial and 
executive aircraft worldwide. Analysis of the causes has shown that landing long 
on the runway was a causal factor in 40% of all landing overruns [Van Es (2010)]. 
Further analysis also showed that the risk of overrunning the runway increases 
by a factor in the order of 55 when the landing is long [Van Es (2005)]. 
Touchdowns of more than 600-700 m from the threshold are typically 
considered long landings. However there is no formal definition of what a long 
landing is. In some cases for short runways a value of 25-33% of the runway 
length is used as the airborne distance from which a landing is considered long. 
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To a pilot landing 600-700 m from the threshold could be still within the 
touchdown zone indicated on the runway and could look perfectly correct. 
However airborne distances of more than 600-700 m are normally much higher 
than assumed in the landing performance data. Depending on the available 
runway and the prevailing conditions the remaining runway could not be enough 
when landing long.  
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
A long landing is clearly unwanted as it increases the required landing distance. 
As a consequence the available margin in landing distance reduces, increasing 
the risk of a landing overrun. The airborne distance (from threshold to 
touchdown) is affected by a number of factors. This paper discusses the most 
important factors that are related to the airborne distance and their relation to 
long landings. For this purpose an analysis is conducted of both landing 
overruns in which long landings were a causal factor as well as flight data of 
day-to-day landings obtained from a number of (mainly) European operators. 
More than 211 landing overruns are analysed in which a long landing was cited 
as a causal factor [data obtained from Van Es (2005)]. Typical factors that are 
related to long landings are identified from these occurrence data. Flight data 
obtained from more than 75,000 landings made with commercial jet aircraft are 
also analysed for factors influencing long landings [Van Es, Van der Geest, 
(2006)]. The result of the presented analysis should bring some information 
about the important factors related to long landings. This can result in effective 
mitigations against long landings and hence reduce the number of landing 
overruns in the future.  
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2 CERTIFICATION, AIRCRAFT OPERATING 
MANUALS AND THE AIRBORNE DISTANCE 
In this section a brief summary is given on how the landing airborne distance is 
treated during certification, and how it is used in performance data available to 
the pilot.  
 
The Aircraft Flight Manual AFM contains certified information on the landing 
performance of an aircraft. For many commercial aircraft this landing 
performance is based on test flights flown by proficient test pilots, using rates of 
sink and flare not considered acceptable in service for passenger comfort. This is 
done to reduce test landing variability and give a limiting measure of the actual 
aircraft performance. A long float prior to touchdown is distance wasted to the 
manufacturer and will be avoided during test flights. A demonstration of 
maximum performance in which steep approaches and high touchdown sink 
rates are permitted, is no longer considered acceptable for newly certified 
aircraft. AFM landing distance is measured from a screen height (usually 50ft 
RA), irrespective of whereabouts on the runway this height is achieved. It is then 
assumed that the airline pilot achieves this screen height over the runway 
threshold. The assumptions regarding airborne distance will be invalid should 
the airline pilot not achieve this. A number of aircraft manufactures provide 
additional landing performance data in the Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM). This 
information is not certified and the manufacturer provides this as advisory only. 
These landing performance data are used for in-flight assessment of the 
required landing distance prior to landing. The airborne distance used in the 
advisory landing data is not necessarily the same as the value archived the 
during flight tests. Landing performance data provided by the aircraft 
manufacturers for in-flight landing distance assessment can assume that the 
aircraft touches from a certain distance from the threshold (typically in the order 
of 300-500m depending on aircraft model).  
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3 FACTORS INFLUENCING AIRBORNE DISTANCE 
AND LONG LANDINGS 
There are a number of factors that influence the airborne distance which can also 
affect the possibility of a long landing. These factors are discussed now. Both 
data on landing overruns as well as data from day-to-day landings are used for 
this analysis [Van Es (2005), Van Es, et. al., (2006)]. The collection and analysis of 
day-to-day landings was conducted as part of a multi-year project sponsored by 
the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center. 
3.1 APPROACH SPEED 
The approach speed has a large influence on the airborne distance. Typically the 
airborne distance shows a more or less linear relation with the approach speed. 
Flying too fast can therefore result in longer landings. It can also result in 
floating as the pilot wants to get rid of the excess speed. Landing overrun 
accident data showed that excess approach speed was presented in 44% of the 
cases in which a long landing was also cited. Analysis of flight data showed that 
during long landings the average speed excess was twice as high compared to 
normal landings. Note that on average aircraft tend to land at a speed somewhat 
above the bug speed (=VREF+5kt+wind corrections). High speeds during the 
airborne manoeuvre are often related to unstabilised approaches.  
3.2 HEIGHT OVER THRESHOLD 
The height at which the aircraft crosses the threshold can have a significant 
impact on the airborne distance. Flying too high above the threshold can result in 
a long landing. An aircraft is considered to be high above the threshold when the 
(radio) altitude at the threshold crossing is roughly 4.5 m (15 ft.) above the 
normal threshold crossing height. Landing overrun accident data showed that 
being high above the threshold was presented in 13% of the cases in which a 
long landing was cited. Flight data on a number of narrow body commercial jet 
aircraft show that for each meter that the aircraft is too high at threshold the 
airborne distance increases in order of 15-20 meters (see Figure 1). Analysis of 
these flight data also showed that in 20% of the long landings the aircraft was 
too high above the threshold. Flying too high during the airborne manoeuvre can 
be related to unstabilised approaches. However also approaches that were 
initially stable could end up in flying too high in the final part of the approach. 
There are several factors related to this which are discussed later in this paper 
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Figure 1: Influence of threshold crossing height deviation on airborne distance 
 
The height of the aircraft at the threshold is also related to the approach 
guidance being followed. There are two types of approach guidances namely: 
visual and instrument. Visual approaches are based on visual cues that the pilot 
can follow that will give information about whether the aircraft is on the glide 
slope or not. Landing overrun data showed that in 20% of the cases with a long 
landing such an approach was made. The guidance for visual approach is the 
Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI), Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI), 
and/or the aiming point on the runway (see section on runway markers). The 
visual aid is typically based on a 3-degree glide path. It is located next to the 
runway as such that this path intersects the runway at a certain distance from the 
threshold. This is not always the same position as the aiming point marker (see 
section on runway markers). Visual aids are set up for the largest regular aircraft 
type operating into a given runway. Interpretation of visual approach aids 
therefore depends on aircraft type: smaller aircraft need to adjust their flight 
path towards the “fly-up” region, which may be counter-intuitive to pilots. 
During an ILS approach the aircraft follows the ILS until a decision height after 
which the pilot normally continues the approach using a visual reference. The 
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threshold crossing height is now the height with the aircraft glide slope antenna 
(which can be located at the radome, the nose gear door or at another location 
on the aircraft) centred on the glide slope. The ILS glideslope can coincide with 
the visual references (e.g. PAPI) but this is not always the case. 
 
For approaches without adequate glide path guidance, the pilot should aim to 
cross the threshold at 50ft. RA. Depending on the location of the radio altimeter 
antenna, this may mean that such approaches will have a higher airborne 
distance than during an approach with glide path guidance. 
 
Following an ILS approach to Runway 23 at Coventry, the F27 landed long and 
fast and subsequently overran the end of the runway.  The accident happened in 
daylight (0608L) but in poor weather with rain. Runway 23 is 1,615m. long. 
During the approach, the aircraft had been slightly above the glide slope and had 
maintained a speed of 120kt. (approach target speed 105kt.).  At 200ft. the 
aircraft was still high and fast and the co-pilot 'sought to bring this to the pilot's 
attention' with a call of 'four whites', indicating that the PAPIs were showing the 
aircraft to be high.  The pilot later stated that he had realised that he was 
'slightly steep and slightly fast' and had reduced power in order to reduce the 
speed.  The aircraft touched down in a flat attitude at 114kt. (Vref. plus 19kt.) 
about 600m. down the runway. 
3.3 FLARE HEIGHT AND FLOATING 
A properly executed flare is essential to avoid a long landing. It is important to 
flare at the right altitude, and hold the correct pitch attitude through touchdown. 
When the flare is started the rate of descent is reduced by increase of angle of 
attack which also results in a decrease of airspeed. The flight-path curvature (or 
load factor) during the flare may be limited by the pitch control response, by the 
speed margin above the stall and possibly by the throttle response. Angle of 
attack limits the extent to which an aircraft may be allowed to float. If the flare 
begins too early, the airplane may float resulting in an increased landing 
distance. Ground effect during flare can be pronounced. Once flare has been 
established any floating tendency can be counteracted by a slight forward motion 
of the control column. Flight data showed that during long landings the average 
amount of speed bled off during the flare was some 65% higher than during 
normal landings. It is not necessary that the aircraft flies too fast to see a high 
amount of speed being bled off during the flare. However, there is a bit more 
tendency for pilots doing so when the speed is high. The optimum flare usually 
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only requires increasing pitch attitude by about a few degrees. The actual 
recommended flare initiation height depends on the aircraft type considered. For 
commercial jets 20-30 ft. is a typical flare initiation height. Analysis of flight data 
showed that during long landings the flare initiation height was some 10% higher 
compared to normal landings. The analysed overrun data indicated that in 20% of 
the cases the flare was initiated too early. 
 
The aircraft was destroyed when it overran the runway on landing.  Following an 
apparently normal ILS approach in fine weather the 727, possibly due to 
encountering turbulence as it entered the flare, did not touch-down at the 
intended point but instead floated a considerable distance down the runway 
before eventually making contact some 2,500 to 3,000ft beyond the runway 
threshold.  The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the 
captain's actions and his judgment following a long touch-down with insufficient 
runway remaining.  The long touch-down was attributed to a deviation from the 
prescribed landing techniques and an encounter with an adverse wind condition 
common at the airport.   
3.4 TAILWIND AND WIND SHEAR 
Tailwind increases ground speed and hence ground distance. The landing 
overrun data showed that in 15% of the long landings a (significant) tailwind was 
also present. Flight data showed that in 52% of the long landings a tailwind was 
present. In 8% of the long landings the tailwind was 10 kts or higher. Tailwind 
can also result in higher approach path. There are examples that when a 
headwind turned into a tailwind close to the runway the aircraft started to go 
above the optimum approach slope (often also related to auto thrust de-
selection prior to this event). This could lead to a destabilised approach. If not 
recognised by the pilots it can result in a long landing.  
The landing overrun data revealed that changing winds, wind gusts and wind 
shear were reported in 8% of all events with a long landing. These winds 
contributed to longer flares. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2011-120 
March 2011   13 
 
During the final stage of a visual approach to Bhojpur, the DHC-6 was reportedly 
caught by a gust of wind and subsequently 'floated' for some distance.  As a 
result the aircraft touched down some 900ft beyond the normal point and then 
could not be stopped on the remaining runway length. The aircraft overran and 
fell into a ditch.   
3.5 TOUCHDOWN ZONE MARKERS 
The touchdown should take place within the touchdown zone. This area is 
indicated by touchdown markings. ICAO Annex 14 contains the basic 
requirements for these runway markings. Touchdown zone markings consist of 
several pairs of rectangular blocks at fixed intervals from the threshold. They 
provide reference points for a pilot to assess their progress towards the fixed 
distance markers. For runways longer than 2,400 meters the touchdown zone 
has a total length of 900 meters and the so-called aiming point marking is 
located 400 meters beyond the threshold. Runways with a length between 1,500 
m and 2,400 m should have a touchdown zone with a length of 600 m and an 
aiming point marker 300 meters beyond the threshold. For airports in the US the 
aiming point is located at 1,000 ft. beyond the threshold. The aiming point 
marking serves as a visual aiming point for a landing aircraft. It indicates where 
the aircraft should touchdown. ICAO Annex 14 prescribes the minimum distance 
from the threshold of the aiming point marker. Surveys of actual markings on 
runway indicate that in reality things may be quite different. There are many 
examples of aiming point markers that are much further away from the threshold 
than recommend by ICAO. This would mean that the aircraft could land much 
longer than assumed. An example is an airport in Europe where the aiming point 
was located at almost 500 m from the threshold whereas 300 m was advised by 
ICAO (runway was 2,200 m long). Analyses of flight data of landings at this 
particular runway showed a 14% longer airborne distance than the fleet average 
and a twice as high probability of a long landing. There are many more similar 
examples for other airports. Touchdown aiming point markers that are further 
away than recommend can contribute to the occurrence of long landings.  
 
There are pilots that believe that the aiming point marker is always located at the 
same position for each runway. Clearly this is not the case. Also the fact that the 
PAPI is not always located next to the aiming point is not considered by every 
pilot. This could lead to longer landings for smaller aircraft than for which the 
PAPI was setup. 
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3.6 RUNWAY LENGTH AND RUNWAY EXITS 
Another factor that is believed to have an influence on the airborne distance is 
the runway length (or landing distance available LDA). In Figure 2 the average 
airborne distance of a large number of transport aircraft as function of LDA is 
shown. These data were obtained from analysed flight data and video surveys 
conducted by the FAA (mainly US runways). The video surveys results (marker by 
an asterisk) are based on a more limited data set than the flight data derived 
airborne distances. Although the data show scatter there is some trend visible for 
runways shorter than 2,400 m. Below this LDA the average airborne distance 
seems to decrease. This could be partly due to the ICAO aiming point markers 
located at 300 m instead of 400 m. This also applies to the video results from US 
airports which have the aiming point located at around 300 m. (1000 ft). The 
three data points in Figure 2 showing the lowest average airborne distance are 
for London City airport. This airport has a lower screen height of 35 ft. (steep 
approach) which results in shorter airborne distances. Also the short runway of 
this airport makes the pilots to land more on the marks. 
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Figure 2: Influence of available landing distance (LDA) on average airborne distance  
(* data obtained from FAA video surveys) 
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When looking more closely to the data of Figure 2 it became clear that in only 6% 
of landings upon the figure was based, the aircraft exited the runway at or near 
the end of the runway. In all other cases an earlier exit was used. Especially high 
speed exits that are close to the threshold can have an influence on the airborne 
distance. The analysed flight data showed a stronger correlation with the location 
of the runway exits and the airborne distance than with the LDA. On average the 
airborne distance increases with some 15% when using exits close to the runway 
end compared to high speed exits. However when looking at long landings the 
selected runway exit has a much more significant influence. Flight data showed 
that the probability of a long landing is 15 times higher when using exits near 
the end compared to using high speed exits. 
3.7 MISCELLANEOUS FACTORS 
There are a number of miscellaneous factors that can influence the airborne 
distance. These factors could not always be quantified with the data used in this 
study. Some of these factors are discussed in this section. 
 
Runway slope 
Runway up slope can reduce the airborne distance whereas a down slope does 
the opposite. This is a pure geometrical effect. Runway slope can also introduce 
visual illusions which can affect the airborne distance. When there is a downslope 
in the runway the pilot could experience a below glide path illusion. In this case 
the reference to the runway gives the illusion that the approach is too shallow 
and hence the feeling that the aircraft is too low. When correcting for this 
apparent too low approach the aircraft can land long. There have been a number 
of landing overruns and long landing incidents in which this factor played a role. 
The influence of runway slope will be more noticeable for relatively large runway 
slopes (say 1.5-2%) which are not often found at commercial airports around the 
world. 
 
On August 6, 1998, a Hawker Siddeley 748 landed at Kasabonika, Ontario, on a 
freight flight from Pickle Lake, Ontario. During the landing roll, the aircraft could 
not be stopped and overran the runway. The aircraft landed long and touched at 
a point from which it could not be stopped under the prevailing conditions. The 
down-slope of the runway provided misleading visual cues to the crew on 
approach and may have made it more difficult for them to fly the aircraft on the 
optimal descent angle. 
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Visibility 
The sudden change of visibility during the final stages of the approach can also 
influence the airborne distance. This can be due to heavy rain, sun glare, haze, 
fog or other external factors. Extreme rain showers during the flare have resulted 
in pilots losing reference with the runway and ending up in a long landing. Heavy 
rain was present in 16% of the landing overruns in which a long landing also 
occurred. This gives an indication of the influence of reduced visibility due to 
heavy rains in long landings. The analysed flight data did not contain many 
flights that were conducted during heavy rain or low visibility. Therefore no 
conclusions could be drawn from those data regarding the influence of visibility 
on long landings.  
 
Flight path angle 
In theory the flight path angle at threshold crossing can have an influence on the 
airborne distance. A very flat approach can result in longer landings. However in 
only a few cases of the analysed landing overrun data this was quoted as a 
factor. Analysis of flight data also did not show this to be a major factor to long 
landings. 
 
Runway width 
Wide, long runways can give visual illusions which could result into early flares. 
This is caused by false angular perception by the pilot resulting in the illusion 
that the aircraft is lower that in reality. The analysed landing overrun data and 
flight data do not give an adequate statistical basis to quantify the effect of 
runway width on long landings.  
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4 FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper several factors that influence the airborne distance which can also 
affect the possibility of a long landing are discussed. It is clear that that are 
several factors that can be a reason for the aircraft to land long. The most 
dominate factors are flying too high and too fast during the airborne manoeuvre, 
significant tailwind, early flares, floating of the aircraft, and use of runway exits 
far down on a relatively long runway (it appears that long landings are not 
strongly correlated to the actual runway length: they occur as frequently on 
relatively short runways as on long runways with ample landing distance 
available. The runway exit position has a much stronger influence on the 
probability of long landings). Some of these factors could occur simultaneously 
increasing the possibility of a long landing even further. A large number of the 
factors that contributed to long landings can be traced back to an unstabilised 
approach. It is well known that flying a stabilised approach is important to flight 
safety. Other factors are related to good flying skills, decision making (e.g. 
decide to go-around) and adequate monitoring by the crew.  
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